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MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT: CURRENT
PROBLEMS, AUGUSTINIAN PROSPECTS.
By Graham Walker.

Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. ix, 189. $25.
Many of the central controversies in contemporary constitutional
thought concern the proper relationship of law and morality. Advocates of judicial restraint - adopting what is sometimes termed "conventionalism" or "positivism" - argue that judges should avoid
injecting their moral views into constitutional analysis. 1 Critics of this
approach - often supporting more activist judicial policies - argue
that moral considerations are essential to legal analysis in general and
constitutional interpretation in particular. 2
In his book, Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought, Graham Walker, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, uses Augustinian philosophy to resolve what he
characterizes as the "normative impasse" implicit in current constitutional theory. Walker takes the innovative tack of using moral arguments to justify the partial exclusion of moral considerations from
constitutional questions. In this project he enlists the aid of Augustine, whom he contends "provides deeply nonpositivist grounds for an
almost positivist vision of law" (p. 7). Ultimately, Walker's critique of
current constitutional thought is more successful than his application
of Augustinian philosophy to contemporary constitutional problems.
Nevertheless, his attempt to establish a moral basis for conventionalism and judicial restraint suggests some valuable new lines of analysis,
especially for legal conservatives dissatisfied with the morally ambiguous positivism of Robert Bork and others.
The most successful part of Walker's analysis is his critique of contemporary constitutional thought. Initially, he contends that, because
theories of constitutional analysis are inherently prescriptive, such theories must imply some basic normative background. Constitutional
1. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTII AMENDMENT (1977); R. Boll, TRAI>mON AND MORALITY IN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1984); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971); Rehnquist, Government by Cliche: Keynote Address of the Earl F. Nelson Lecture
Series, 45 Mo. L. REv. 379 (1980); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution. 54 TEXAS L.
REV. 693 (1976).
Identifying judicial restraint with "conventionalism" and "positivism" is somewhat problematic. For example, H. Hart's legal positivism, with its insistence on the separation of law and
morality, is related to the judicial restraint scholarship but less prescriptive in its conclusions.
See H. HART, THE CoNCEFT OF LAW 206 (1961) (arguing for the definitional separation oflaw
and morality, but noting that "the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of
the question of obedience," since legal rules "must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny").
2. See, e.g, L. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 5 (1985); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958). Contemporary "moral realists" also fall into this category. See infra text accompanying note 14.
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analysis cannot "suspend itself in midair, independent of any substantive political morality"; it must be justified by some reference to higher
principles of the good (pp. 9-10). This normative element is especially
clear in the unapologetically moral language of the fifth, eighth, and
fourteenth amendments (p. 11).
However, according to Walker, most contemporary constitutional
theorists engage in "normative evasions" (p.13). Former federal judge
Robert Bork, for example, advocates a conventionalist approach to
constitutional theory which rejects any investigation of transcendent
moral questions. 3 Bork argues that courts should "let the majority
have its way" in moral controversies since there is "no principled
way" for judges to distinguish competing moral claims.4 He bases this
approach on the skeptical conclusion that moral considerations are
mere "forms of gratification."5 Walker criticizes Bork for adopting a
form of nihilist skepticism and setting up the majority will as a "conventional surrogate for a real morality" (p. 14). Walker contends that
since Bork's theories of interpretation (Framers' intent) and of adjudication (judicial restraint) are ultimately prescriptive, these theories
must be justified by an appeal to moral and political philosophy. By
rejecting the possibility of real moral standards, Bork thus undermines
his own project.
Walker argues that similar philosophical inconsistencies afflict
many ostensibly nonpositivist constitutional scholars. Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, while admitting that substantive moral analysis is unavoidable in constitutional analysis, 6 concludes that the
search for real moral truths is "[f]utile."7 Walker contends that this
moral nihilism makes Tribe's advocacy of various causes and constitutional interpretations untenable (p. 16). Walker examines the work of
other constitutional scholars, including John Hart Ely, Michael Perry,
and Lief Carter, 8 and concludes that each fails to provide an adequate
3. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Bork, supra note 1, at 10.
4. Bork, supra note 1, at 10.
5. Id. Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues for legal positivism on the grounds that
fundamental moral principles cannot be "logically demonstrate[d]." Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, supra note 1, at 704. This kind of skepticism and deference to majority rule
may have its earlier roots in the writings of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See, e.g. O.W.
HOLMES, Natural Law, in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310 (1920) (reaffirming his statement
that "truth was the majority vote of the nation that could lick all others").
6. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 4 (affirming his belief "that constitutional interpretation is a
practice alive with choice but laden with content; and that this practice has both boundaries and
moral significance not wholly reducible to, although never independent of, the ends for which it
is deployed").
7. Id. at 3. Tribe writes, "I genuinely believe ••• [in] the ultimate futility of the quest for an
Archimedean point outside ourselves from which the legitimacy of some form of judicial review
or constitutional exegesis may be affirmed." Id. at 5.
8. See, e.g., L. CARTER, CoNTEMPORARY CoNSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME
CoURT AND THE ART OF PoLmcs (1985); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OP
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); M. PERRY, MORALITY, PoLmcs, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL
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moral basis for constitutional thought {pp. 34-40). Instead, these theorists, in one way or another, reduce morality to a "socially fabricated
convention" {p. 17) without any independent reality.9
Walker has the most problems characterizing the thought of Professor Ronald Dworkin. 10 At first, Walker characterizes Dworkin's
"law as integrity" model from Law's Empire as an elaborated form of
"softer" conventionalism {p. 43). According to Walker, Dworkin appears merely to construe existing moral and legal conventions in their
best light without reference to transcendent, ahistorical truths {pp. 4344). Walker's suspicions here are understandable given the ambivalent
treatment of nihilist skepticism in Law's Empire. 11 Nonetheless,
Dworkin's approach to legal interpretation explicitly contains both a
"fit" element dependent on past legal decisions and a "justification"
element tied to higher issues of "political morality." 12 Walker eventually acknowledges that Dworkin's theory "impl[ies] some basis in real,
not just conventional, morality" {p. 44). Nevertheless, Walker's conceptual problems with Dworkin ultimately prevent him from appreciating the fundamental similarities between his "Augustinian"
approach to constitutional law and Dworkin's "law as integrity"
model. 13
Overall, Walker concludes that most mainstream constitutional
theorists, with the possible exception of Ronald Dworkin, adopt one
form or another of moral nihilism, eschewing any attempt to justify
their positions on the basis of real moral truths. This nihilism, however, undermines the prescriptive claims made by these same theorists.
Walker persuasively argues that these contemporary scholars are left
in an intellectual and moral dead end, paralyzed by their own relativism ·{pp. 61-64).
But what viable alternatives to these conventional approaches exist? One group of "moral realist" thinkers, such as Michael S. Moore,
Sotirious Barber, and John Courtney Murray, S.J., argue that courts
should explicitly base constitutional analysis on transcendent moral
principles. 14 Though they differ on certain assumptions, all three conEssAY (1988); Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A ''Naturalist" Perspective, 20 GA. L. REV. 995 (1986).

9. Walker argues that the adherents of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement make the
same mistake, advocating radical goals on moral grounds, while simultaneously denying the possibility of transcendent truths. According to Walker, these scholars fail to realize that their
nihilism undercuts the justifications for their radicalism. For examples of CLS scholarship, see
R. UNGER, THE CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Tushnet, The Dilemmas ofLiberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981).
10. See generally R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
11. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 78-83.
12. Id. at 254-56.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 18, 28.
14. See generally s. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CoNSTITUTION MEANS (1984); J. MURRAY,
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tend that the good has a real existence beyond mere convention and
that humans have the ability to apprehend the good, at least to some
degree.
Walker contends that these theories provide a substantial improvement over conventionalism because they acknowledge the explicitly
moral character of constitutional interpretation and, more generally,
provide a firmer normative basis for legal analysis (p. 57). Nevertheless, moral realism, by essentially eliminating the distinction between
law and morality, raises the specter of unchecked judicial activism and
even tyranny. 15 Moral realists such as Moore respond that their ideal
judge would still place a high practical value on precedent, consistency
and the rule of law, 16 but Walker finds these "epistemological disclaimers" unpersuasive, given Moore's activist agenda.17
Thus, although he does not explicitly admit it, Walker faces a
choice similar to that of Dworkin in Law,s Empire. On the one hand,
conventionalism provides an inadequate normative basis for legal decisionmaking and coercion. On the other hand, moral realism (what
Dworkin calls "pragmatism" 18) collapses the distinction between law
and morality to the point where law becomes merely the ''judge's own
best current theory of goodness" (p. 146). Such an approach fails to
address the problem of moral indeterminacy or restrain the potential
for judicial abuse. The inadequacy of these alternatives produces what
Walker calls a "normative impasse" (pp. 61-64). How can one provide
an adequate moral basis for legal decisionmaking while still preserving
the notion of law qua law?
Walker suggests that the philosophy of Augustine, the fourth- and
fifth-century Catholic scholar and saint, may provide an answer. 19
According to Walker, Augustine addresses a philosophical dilemma
similar to the contemporary normative impasse in constitutional
thought. The normative impasse of antiquity pitted the nihilism of the
Manichaeans and Academic Skeptics against the utopian moralism of
WE HOLD THEsE TRUTHS: CATIIOLIC REFLECTIONS ON TIIE AMERICAN PROPOSmON (1960);
Barber, Epistemological Skepticism, Hobbesian Natural Right, and Judicial Self-Restraint, 48
REv. POL. 374 (1986); Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in Constitutional Law,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 253 (1986); Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory (Book
Review), 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 453 (1987); Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation. 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985).
15. For example, Michael Moore argues that judges, when confronted by hard cases, should
ultimately follow their own moral convictions instead of conventional mores. See Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, supra note 14, at 388-96.
16. See id. at 313-18, 358-76.
17. According to Walker, Moore "effects a practical fusion of law and morality and recommends a judicial moral activism whose only constraint is its own prudence." P. 54.
18. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 151-75.
19. As a preliminary matter, Walker assures his readers that they need not embrace Augustine's theology in order to benefit from "the intellectual exercise" of his book. Pp. 7-8. The
problems and limitations presented by Walker's reliance on Augustine's theology are discussed
infra at note 27 and accompanying text.
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the classical philosophers and the Pelagian heretics. 20 In his writings,
Augustine rejects both of these altematives.21
First, Augustine contends that fundamental principles of goodness
exist and that man can understand, if only imperfectly, these principles (p. 94). Thus, Augustine rejects the Manichaeans and skeptics of
his time who regarded reality as fundamentally void or evil. Walker,
in turn, employs Augustine's arguments for the possibility of true
knowledge of the good to refute the nihilist skepticism of contemporary constitutional scholars (pp. 116-24).
Second, Augustine also rejects the utopian moralism of classical
philosophy as unable to account for the experience of indeterminacy.
Augustine argues that, as a consequence of the Biblical Fall, man and
nature are fundamentally flawed (pp. 84-86). This deficiency renders
all human knowledge partially indeterminate and unstable. Thus, the
experience of indeterminacy is not merely an epistemological problem,
but is rather an ontological problem tied to the inherently flawed character of man and nature (pp. 96-97). According to Augustine, classical philosophy, with its search for transcendent principles in nature,
cannot account for these fundamental deficiencies.
Augustine's ontological insights lead him to characterize history as
the story of two cities: the City of God and the City of Man (pp. 10005). The citizens of the City of God attempt to order their lives in
accord with divine revelation and the true good. The citizens of the
earthly city (often identified with Babylon and Rome) seek out various
surrogates for God in personal affections and passions. In Augustine's
philosophy, neither of these cities exists as a particular political state;
rather, both are intermingled in every sphere of life. Given man's intrinsically vitiated nature, Augustine emphatically rejects efforts to establish the City of God as an actual sacred state. Such a utopian effort
is not only doomed to failure but is also dangerously at odds with
human nature (pp. 105-08).
Walker concludes that Augustine's vision of the limited role of the
state provides the foundation for a "principled argument against a
politics of principle" (p. 111). Augustine's conclusions concerning the
instability and indeterminacy of man's moral knowledge inspire a
strong political and legal prudence (p. 114). Thus, politics and law
can only play a marginal role in the salvation of man; they must focus
20. The Manichaeans maintained a dualistic theory in which two ultimate principles, one
good and the other evil, battled throughout eternity. See 2 F. CoPLESTON, A HlsTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 56 (1962). They held that nature and reality were fundamentally void and evil, and
thus provided no basis for moral knowledge. See pp. 109-10. The Academic Skeptics advocated
a form of epistemological nihilism which denied the possibility of moral truths. See p. 91. In
contrast, the "realists" of antiquity such as Plato, Aristotle, and the Pelegian heretics maintained
that reality contained a true and knowable moral order. P. 109.
21. See generally AUGUSTINE, CrrY OF Goo (M. Dods trans. 1950); AUGU511NE, CoNFESSIONS (H. Chadwick trans. 1991).
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instead on the more mundane project of providing for temporal peace.
Walker argues that this vision of government provides a moral basis
for an almost modem vision of government moral neutrality (pp. 102,
106). Here Walker may make Augustine into too much of a contemporary liberal, especially given Augustine's defense of the use of secular power to suppress the Donatist heretics of his day. 22 Nonetheless,
many scholars have found in Augustine the origins of the W estem
secular state. 23
Walker concludes that, while Augustine's philosophy underscores
the inadequacy of conventionalism, his ontologically-inspired prudence also reins in the potentially utopian ambitions of the moral realists (pp. 137, 139-52). Augustine's prudence thus provides a moral
justification for deference to convention and legal precedent (pp. 13952), for the partial separation of law and morality, and for a "certain
semblance of neutrality on the part of the political order and its rule of
law" (p. 115).
Walker here offers a striking improvement over the nihilism of
most contemporary constitutional scholars, while still recognizing the
drawbacks of moral realism. Walker's analysis should be particularly
relevant to judicial conservatives, since it provides an explicit moral
basis for a degree of judicial restraint. Walker substantially improves
upon the relativistic arguments traditionally relied upon to justify judicial restraint. 24 More generally, Walker's analysis provides new insights into the moral justifications for the apparent "neutrality" of the
traditional liberal state.
Nevertheless, Walker's prudential justification for judicial restraint
remains fundamentally underdeveloped. Initially, Walker's prudential
arguments fail to account for the importance of precedent and consis22. See Dawson, St. Augustine and His Age, in ST. AUGUSTINE 1, 74 (1961). The Donatists
were a group of North African Christians who rejected the Catholic Church for its association
with the Roman Empire. Christopher Dawson writes that:
[T)he Donatist movement was not only a spiritual protest against any compromise with the
world; it also roused all the forces of social discontent and national fanaticism. The wild
peasant bands of the Circumcellions, who roamed the country, with their war-cry of "Deo
laudes," were primarily religious fanatics who sought an opportunity of martyrdom. But
they were also champions of the poor and the oppressed, who forced landlords to en·
franchise their slaves and free their debtors ...•
Id. at 55-56.
23. See, e.g., 2 F. CoPLESTON, supra note 20, at 104-05. Similarly, Dawson argues that,
In the West ... St. Augustine broke decisively with this tradition [of sacred monarchies] by
depriving the state of its aura of divinity and seeking the principle of social order in the
human will. In this way the Augustinian theory, for all its otherworldliness, first made
possible the ideal of a social order resting upon the free personality and a common effort
toward moral ends.
Dawson, supra note 22, at 77.
24. In this respect, Walker's analysis is similar to that of Harry Jaffa, a conservative critic of
Judge Bork and an advocate of natural rights-based adjudication. See Jaffa, The Closing of the
Conservative Mind: Judge Robert H. Bork and Original Intent, NATL. REv., July 9, 1990, at 40;
Jaffa, Judge Bork's Mistake, NATL. REV., Mar. 4, 1988, at 38.
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tency in legal interpretation. As Dworkin would argue, Walker's justifications for following precedent are primarily "pragmatic" or
"strategic,"25 and fail to account for the authoritative value that
judges and lawyers place on past judicial decisions and statutes.
Walker tries to address these criticisms by claiming that the ontological basis of Augustine's prudence provides a "deeper and more selfconscious" version of judicial caution (p. 149). Furthermore, he notes
that established conventions such as law can provide insights and a
"source of clues" into the nature of true morality (p. 155).
Walker's arguments fail, however, to establish a unique authority
in the law itself. Walker does not adequately explain why positive law
is different from such conventional sources of moral authority as philosophy, religion, and common sense. While Walker's ideal judge defers to the law as a prudential check on his ambitions and consults the
law as a guide to true morality, decisionmakers often accord similar
deference and authority to other conventional sources of morality.
Thus, just because Walker's judge would be more cautious and deferential doesn't make his decisions any more legal. Ultimately, the judicial restraint imposed by Walker's prudence differs only in degree and
not in kind from the caution advocated by the moral realists, since
even these theorists admit to the value of caution and deference to
precedent (pp. 54-55).
These problems with Walker's thesis stem, in part, from his failure
to develop adequately his prudence-based jurisprudence. While he explains the Augustinian origins of this prudence, he fails to elaborate on
its content or relative weight. When does the immorality of a law start
to outweigh a judge's prudential deference to convention? Do past
legal decisions carry actual moral weight or are they merely guideposts for higher moral insights? Walker's analysis would benefit if he
attempted to address some actual "hard cases."2 6
A related problem with Walker's approach is his failure to differentiate adequately between Augustine's philosophical and theological
assumptions. Since much of Augustine's vision is intimately linked to
the Hebrew-Christian scriptures, 27 its appeal is substantially limited
for those who do not share the faith. For the most part, Walker does
not attempt to "translate" Augustine's philosophy into more religiously neutral language. Perhaps to do so would destroy the fundamental insights that Augustine has to offer for constitutional thought.
But if Walker cannqt adequately detach Augustine's philosophical in25. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 158-59, 162.
26. For example, in their famous debates Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart discuss various hard
cases resulting from a statute prohibiting "vehicles" in a public park. See Fuller, supra note 2, at
663; Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 607 (1958).
Dworkin takes a similar approach, using the question of emotional tort damages as a test for his
theory of law as integrity. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 238-50.
27. See 2 F. CoPLESfON, supra note 20, at 62-65.
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sights from the saint's theological views, the value of the book's approach may be substantially limited.
That having been said, it is important to note that the structure of
Walker's project seems fundamentally correct. From a logical standpoint, any prescriptive theory of interpretation must, almost by definition, justify itself on normative grounds. To base a constitutional
theory on mere convention undermines the very project of interpretation. Nevertheless, pure moral realism seems to invite judicial abuse
and legal uncertainty. Ultimately, some kind of middle course must
be chosen which provides an adequate moral basis for legal interpretation while preserving the role for positive law as a unique source of
authority. In this project, Walker's approach shares some basic similarities with Dworkin's law as integrity project.28 Walker's Augustinian solution suggests some important new lines of inquiry into the
moral foundations of legal analysis.
- Arthur J. Burke

28. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 225·75.

